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Introduction
Many environmental problems, such as climate change or the loss of biodiversity, are driven by negative externalities. Essentially, such externalities cause market failure for which conventional economic wisdom suggests introducing governmental policies in the form of taxes or subsidies (e.g. Pigou 1932 , Baumol 1972 . These suggestions rely on the assumption of purely self-centered human behavior. However, this assumption is not generally justified since human beings often assume moral responsibility, that is in their actual behavior they respond to moral obligations (e.g. Sen 1977 , Brekke et al. 2011 , Perino et al. 2011 . Furthermore, Motivation Crowding Theory (e.g. Deci 1971 or Frey 1997 , 2001 suggests that extrinsic interventions, such as governmental policies, severely affect individuals' motivation to assume moral responsibility. In this paper, we study the regulation of a morally responsible individual with motivation crowding in the context of a negative consumption externality.
In the case of environmental policies, command and control instruments, but also incentive-based instruments such as tradable emission rights or Pigouvian taxes, tend to undermine moral motivation, while information, appeals and participation enhance moral motivation (Frey and Jegen 2001) . Empirical evidence is plentiful, 1 but there are few theoretical studies on the issue and these do not simultaneously consider negative externalities and motivation crowding. Heyes and Kapur (2011) analyze how moral motivation, in the context of negative externalities, affects the optimal specification of particular policy instruments. Their focus, however, is on motivational heterogeneity and they do not consider the case of motivation crowding. Further literature on moral motivation has mainly focused on the voluntary provision of public goods by morally motivated individuals (e.g. Andreoni 1988 , 1990 , Brekke et al. 2003 , Nyborg and Rege 2003 . Moral motivation is generally modeled as a warm-glow, based on a utilitarian norm by which an optimal level of giving is defined. Something like motivation crowding occurs in those models when environmental policies influence the optimal level of giving.
We contribute to the literature in three ways: First, we consider the case of externalities which is more general than the case of public goods. Second, we focus on responsible behavior rather than behavior driven by a warm-glow or self-image. Third, we model motivation crowding as a psychological phenomenon (in the sense of the self-determination theory of Deci and Ryan 1985) , and not as a purely economic phenomenon driven by changes in the optimal allocation. Altogether, this allows us to identify fundamental psychological determinants for the efficiency of taxes, provision of information and a policy mix of the two instruments.
More specifically, we analyze the regulation of a morally responsible individual in the context of a negative consumption externality and motivation crowding, focusing on the moral principle: 'You ought not to consciously harm others against their will'. Against this 2 background, we focus on two questions: (1) Is responsibility -understood as moral motivation of individual actors -sufficient for Pareto efficiency in a decentralized economy when individual action causes negative externalities? (2) Can a Pigouvian tax, provision of perfect information, or a complementary policy combining both instruments lead to Pareto efficiency when moral motivation is subject to motivation crowding?
For this analysis, we use a simple model: there are two goods, one numeraire good and one polluting good, and two individuals, A and B. A derives utility from private consumption of both goods and a morally weighted disutility from her knowledge about her causing the externality. B derives utility from the numeraire good and disutility from A's consumption of the polluting good. We thus have an asymmetric, unidirectional power structure, as A is responsible for the harm inflicted on B.
2 The moral weight in A's utility function reflects the personal desirability of responsible behavior and is affected by policy measures (motivation crowding): it decreases with a tax, and increases with provision of information. The model thus allows us to study the effects of regulatory policies with respect to Pareto efficiency: price regulation through a Pigouvian tax on the polluting good, descriptive information provisioning as lowering uncertainty about the externality, and a complementary policy combining both instruments.
Our results show that morally responsible behavior will in general not lead to Pareto efficiency without governmental intervention as it may diminish or exacerbate market failure. Intervention through taxation leads to crowding-out of moral motivation, but there always exists a tax rate so that the equilibrium allocation is efficient. However, such a tax-only policy has three weaknesses due to motivation crowding: First, crowding requires a higher tax rate which may be difficult to implement due to political pressure. Second, setting the tax rate inefficiently low may exacerbate the market failure. And third, an efficient tax rate may fully crowd-out moral motivation if there are motivational spill-overs. Intervention through provision of information is only efficient for very restrictive assumptions, but can be effective in reducing the market failure. Intervention through a complementary tax and information approach is an efficient instrument just as a tax-only policy, and may overcome the weaknesses of a tax-only policy for some (but not for all) parameter values. Altogether, our study highlights the need for the development of new policy instruments in the face of externalities and motivational crowding.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 prepares the conceptual basis for the analysis. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes.
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Conceptual foundations: moral responsibility and motivation crowding
In this section, we prepare the conceptual basis of the paper by first defining the concepts of moral responsibility and motivation crowding. Second, we link both concepts.
Responsibility is a multifarious notion. In the philosophical discussion of responsibility, at least three different aspects of the notion have been distinguished. (1) The primary meaning of responsibility is being the perpetrator of one's own actions, that is, " […] one ascribes an action to oneself and allows for it to be thus ascribed" (Baumgärtner et al. 2006: 227) . The primary meaning is purely descriptive and has no moral relevance by itself. It simply states that A is responsible for X if and only if A is the perpetrator of X. This is a precondition of morality, as one can only be morally praised or blamed for an action that can be ascribed to oneself. (2) When we speak of 'responsibility', we often use 'responsibility' as a synonym for 'obligation' (Williams 2008: 458) . This is what Baumgärtner et al. (2006) call the secondary meaning of responsibility. In this meaning, responsibility attains a moral significance when obligations exist which a person morally has to accept, that is, A ought to do X or ought not to do X for moral reasons. (3) Williams (2008) defines a third meaning of responsibility: "Responsibility represents the readiness to respond to a plurality of normative demands" (Williams 2008: 459) . In other words, responsibility is important whenever individuals are facing a plurality of normative obligations 3 . One specific suggestion as to how to ethically balance two rivaling normative obligations is due to the utilitarianist Peter Singer (1972) . He suggests that two obligations ought to be balanced to the point of marginal utility at which both obligations are equally met at the margin.
In line with the above reflection, we consider the responsibility of an agent for (the consequences of) her actions [aspect 1], as facing a moral obligation [aspect 2] while also striving [aspect 3] for personal happiness. An individual assuming responsibility for her actions is self-negotiating two aims: the obligation to herself to have a good life, and the moral obligation not to harm others against their will. This act of assuming responsibility requires that an individual is motivated to act responsibly.
To be motivated means to be moved to do something. An individual who feels no inspiration to act is characterized as unmotivated, whereas an individual who is activated toward an end is considered motivated (Ryan and Deci 2000: 54) . Individuals may have different levels, but also different kinds of motivation. The psychological literature distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. One is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent rewards except the activity itself (Deci 1971) . Kunda and Schwartz (1983) consider the will to fulfill a moral obligation and to assume responsibility as a special type of intrinsic motivation. Such intrinsic motivation might be either innate or learned (White 1959) , and may thus change. Extrinsic motivation comes from outside the individual. All forms of monetary reward or threat (e.g. 4 taxes, subsidies, fines) are examples of extrinsic motivation. Such extrinsic rewards or threats can lead to overjustification and a subsequent reduction of intrinsic motivation (Kunda and Schwartz 1983) . For example, Titmuss (1971) finds that paying individuals for donating blood might decrease the willingness to donate blood. 4 The reason simply is that individuals wish to donate blood because they are intrinsically motivated to do so. If they are offered a monetary reward, this intrinsic motivation is replaced, or crowded-out, by the extrinsic motivation to receive money. If the intrinsic motivation was stronger than the subsequent extrinsic motivation, the willingness to donate blood decreases.
In the late 1990's, the work of Frey (1997 Frey ( , 2001 ) put motivation crowding on the research agenda of economics. By now, there exists plenty of empirical evidence for economic instruments crowding-out 5 intrinsic motivation in the economic 6 and in the psychological 7
literature. Still open is the question of how the extent of motivation crowding depends on the quantity of monetary compensation or taxes. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) find that individuals' willingness to accept a nuclear waste facility in their neighborhood does not increase with monetary compensation levels. This suggests that the crowding effect of monetary compensation increases with the compensation offered. In contrast, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) find that higher compensations for previously unpaid tasks increase effort levels, which suggests that higher compensation levels do not have stronger crowding effects. Therefore, we leave the relationship between the quantity of the extrinsic intervention and the extent of the crowding effects open. Shedding more light on this relation remains an interesting task for empirical research.
To summarize, individuals want to assume moral responsibility and their intrinsic motivation is the key to understand how they react to governmental policies. Yet, this intrinsic motivation is prone to crowding -both positive and negative -from regulatory intervention. This is the starting point for the analysis in this paper. In the following section, we set up a model of motivation crowing which allows us to study the relationship between people's intrinsic motivation and different policy instruments. 
Government may intervene to regulate the externality through either one, or both, of the following two policy instruments: (1) a Pigouvian tax with tax rate t on the polluting good X, where t may be greater or smaller than zero, i.e. it may be a tax or a subsidy 8 ; (2) provision of perfect information i on the actual extent of damage d(x).
In this unidirectional power structure, in which A's behavior has consequences for B's well-being, we assume that A is morally motivated to act responsibly. In the utility function that determines her actual behavior, she is thus self-negotiating two obligations: the moral obligation not to harm B, and the obligation to maximize her self-directed well-being:
The first part of this additively separable utility function, ( ) . The government's aim is thus to fully inform individual A, so that A becomes fully aware of the harm her consumption of X inflicts on B.
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When A is perfectly informed, the expected damage equals the actual damage. Altogether, it is the knowingly inflicted harm on B which reduces A's utility.
Assuming responsibility for herself and for B, person A self-negotiates her self-directed utility and the known externality with a moral-motivation factor ( , ) m t i 12 that expresses her intrinsic motivation to act responsibly:
A has a basic level ( ) ,0 n t i n t > , because such a policy acknowledges the freedom 11 In order to maximize welfare, a government could use information strategically to reach a Paretoefficient state in the short-run (Asheim 2010). We do not consider this possibility, because information cannot be used strategically in the long-run, as Abraham Lincoln stated: "You may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all the time; but you can't fool all of the people all the time." 12 Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) introduced a somewhat similar model. Our motivation-crowding model for m(t,i) extends theirs as, firstly, they analyzed the effect of only one instrument, which secondly was not a tax or information, but monetary compensation for the willingness to accept a hazardous facility in one's neighborhood. 13 Subscripts denote partial derivatives, in this case
and self-determination of individuals. 16 The government provides Individual B's utility function also has two parts: the linear utility he derives from his own consumption of Y and the harm caused by A's consumption of X:
Let us further assume that both individuals have exogenous income
). By choice of units, the market price of the numeraire good Y equals one, while the market price of X is p. As individual B only consumes the numeraire good, he maximizes his utility (Eq.
( 3)) spending all his income for it:
B B y I = . Individual A maximizes her utility function (Eqs.
(1) and (2)) subject to the budget constraint:
Analysis and Results
Let us start with the equilibrium conditions with and without government intervention:
there uniquely exists an equilibrium allocation of good X, To assess individual behavior and government policies from a societal perspective, we employ the criterion of Pareto-efficiency. An allocation is called Pareto-efficient if and only if it is not feasible to improve the well-being of one person without lowering the well-being of the other person. We do not use a social welfare function to assess social optimality, but rather stay with the weaker efficiency criterion, because any welfare function implies some position on distributive justice, which we do not study here. A second reason for employing the Pareto-efficiency criterion is that our basic concept of moral obligation is that it is wrong to consciously harm others against their will, or in other words, it is wrong to benefit in terms of well-being from doing harm to, that is reducing the well-being of, others. The Paretoefficiency criterion captures this moral obligation very well. 17 The criterion of Paretoefficiency, as a criterion of societal choice, is thus in line with the moral responsibility that individual agents feel obliged to comply with.
There has been a discussion as to whether the moral-motivation term in person A's utility function should be included in the Pareto-efficiency criterion. We follow the predominant view expressed by Hammond (1978) and Diamond (2006) who argue against including this term for a number of reasons.
18 All taken together, Diamond (2006) advocates using the moral-motivation model for positive (i.e. descriptive) purposes only, while staying with the standard model of self-directed well-being for evaluating Pareto-efficiency.
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Lemma 2
There uniquely exists a Pareto-efficient allocation of good X, 0 x > , which is characterized by the following first order condition:
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
The first-order condition for Pareto-efficiency requires that A's marginal utility of consuming X equals A's marginal opportunity cost of consumption plus the marginal costs of the consumption of X, that is, the marginal harm on B. 
Definition 1
The extent of the market failure under government intervention ( )
The extent of the market failure is thus defined as the absolute deviation of the equilibrium allocation * x from the efficient allocation x . This definition allows comparing the extent of the market failure induced by any two government interventions t and i.
For future reference, we define one special case. A shift from one government intervention ( )
t ,i that shifts the equilibrium allocation from ( ) In light of the first-order conditions for the equilibrium and the Pareto-efficient allocations, we now study four different policy scenarios: (1) a "laissez-faire" scenario in which government does not intervene at all; (2) a "tax policy" scenario in which government levies a Pigouvian tax t on the consumption of good X that causes the negative externality, but does not provide any information i on the actual damage caused by the consumption of X; (3) an "information policy" scenario in which government provides perfect information * i about the negative externality caused by good X, but does not levy a tax t; and (4) a "complementary policy" scenario in which government levies a tax t on the consumption of good X that causes the negative externality and also provides perfect information * i .
Laissez-faire
To start with, we consider the laissez-faire scenario without government intervention, i.e. 0 t = and 0 i = .
Proposition 1
The laissez-faire equilibrium allocation, . Thus, morally motivated behavior alone is, in general, not sufficient for Pareto efficiency in the presence of externalities, and government intervention remains necessary to achieve Pareto efficiency. However, moral motivation may diminish or exacerbate the extent of the market failure:
Proof: See Appendix A.3
Whenever individual A faces a moral obligation, she has to self-negotiate it with her desire for personal consumption. In our model, A self-negotiates her moral obligation not to harm B with her personal consumption desire, by having a certain level of moral motivation ( ) 
Tax policy
In this scenario, government introduces a Pigouvian tax t on good X, but provides no information ( 0 i = ). The consumer price of X becomes p t + . Besides the relative price effect, we have motivation crowding-out, as the tax reduces A's moral motivation.
Proposition 2
There exists at least one tax rate
'ˆ, so that the equilibrium allocation ( )
Pareto-efficient. All efficient tax rates are characterized by the following first order condition: Increasing the tax rate at inefficiently low levels may exacerbate the market failure:
Proof: see Appendix A.4
The first order condition given by Eq. (8) reveals that without moral motivation ( ( )
we obtain the standard result: there exists a Pigouvian tax rate which must equal marginal damage ( ) d ' x . As we include moral motivation in the analysis, there exists at least one efficient tax rate, which may, however, differ considerably from ( )
Furthermore, Eq. (8) reveals that there cannot exist an efficient tax rate larger than ( )
This is intuitive, as there are only two possibilities: either a tax rate
, from which it follows that ( )
inefficiently high; or a tax rate
We keep differentiating these two cases for the further discussion. Second, if taxes are set inefficiently low, they may exacerbate the market failure (Eq. (9)). Standard theory suggests that even an inefficiently low Pigouvian tax is an improvement compared to no taxation. If there are crowding effects however, inefficiently low taxation may actually increase the extent of the market failure. This is a serious problem as in reality Pigouvian taxes are frequently set too low.
Third, the efficient tax rate may completely crowd out moral motivation ( ( ) ( )
This is a problem if there are motivational spill-over effects such that the crowding-out effect spreads to unregulated areas of behavior.
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We thus conclude at this point that despite the efficiency of taxes, it remains necessary to investigate alternative policy instruments which are superior to taxes or complement them such that the described side effects are mitigated.
Information policy
We analyze the effect of the provision of perfect information i as an alternative policy instrument. We now assume that rather than levying a tax, the government provides perfect descriptive information * i , such that ( ) * 1 k i = and individual A is perfectly informed of the externality. The aim of the government is thus to enable A to consume responsibly based on all available information. We now examine whether this policy can be Pareto-efficient.
Proposition 3
The equilibrium allocation under provision of perfect information, 
Thus, perfectly informing morally motivated individuals is, in general, neither necessary nor sufficient for Pareto-efficiency.
Perfect information may reduce the extent of the market failure compared to the Laissezfaire:
and (3) there is no strong reversal of market failure.
Proof: see Appendix A.5
The provision of information has two effects on moral motivation: a direct crowding effect and an indirect information effect. The direct crowding effect raises person A's moral motivation. The indirect information effect occurs because the provision of information changes A's knowledge of the externality, which may either increase or decrease. If A underestimates the externality in the Laissez-faire scenario, 1 κ < , information provision increases A's knowledge of the externality and hence the impact of A's moral motivation increases. If A overestimates the externality in the Laissez-faire scenario, 1 κ > , the indirect information effect weakens the effect of A's moral motivation as A's knowledge decreases. The direct and the indirect effect of the provision of information are hence additive for 1 κ < and cause a net increase of moral motivation. For 1 κ > , they are countervailing and cause a net increase (reduction) of moral motivation if the crowding effect is stronger (weaker) than the information effect. 
Complementary policy
Frey (1999) proposes a third policy option as efficient alternative: a complementary policy approach. He argues that " […] where an instrument tends to crowd out the intrinsic motivation […] , an instrument tending to crowd in environmental morale should be used" (Frey 1999: 412 
Compared to t (discussed in Proposition 2), ĉ t has the following properties:
(1) ĉ t is smaller than t , if and only if the motivation effect of perfect information is larger than its information effect:
(2) An inefficiently low tax rate low ĉ, t t t < yields a smaller extent of market failure in the complementary setting than in the tax-only setting, if and only if the motivation effect of perfect information is larger than its information effect and there is no strong reversal of market failure:
(2) there is no strong reversal of market failure.
(3) ĉ t does not fully crowd-out moral motivation while t does, if the motivation effect from the complementary information is strong:
Proof: see Appendix A.6
Proposition 4 shows that combining a tax with the provision of perfect information leads to Pareto efficiency for all parameter values. But more interestingly, a complementary policy may be superior or inferior to a tax-only policy with respect to the three weaknesses discussed in Section 4.2.
First, an efficient complementary policy may require a lower, equal or higher tax rate than a tax-only policy (Eq. (13)). Consider the case when individual A is overmotivated ( 1 µ κ > ).
In this case, we find that a complementary policy requires a higher subsidy rate or a higher taxe rate than a tax only policy except when the provision of information causes a net reduction of moral motivation. 21 In other words, in a situation in which A is overmotivated, complementing a tax with an instrument which further crowds-in moral motivation, does not make sense as this requires an even higher taxe rate. Now, consider the case when individual
). In this case, we find that a complementary policy allows for a lower or equal tax rate than a tax-only policy except, again, the provision of information causes a net reduction of moral motivation. The equality of the tax rates occurs if and only if a tax rate at the level of marginal damage crowds-out all moral motivation with and without provision of moral motivation. This result shows that, even in this case, a complementary policy may or may not be an improvement over a tax-only policy with respect to allowing for a lower tax rate. Yet, it allows for a lower tax rate in the special case in which A is undermotivated, underestimates the externality and in which the marginal crowding effect of the tax is smaller than its relative price effect.
Second, at the same inefficiently low tax rate, a complementary policy may yield a smaller extent of market failure than a tax-only policy (Eq. (14)). The intuition is the following: if A is undermotivated and provision of information causes a net increase in moral motivation for every given tax rate, then complementing any tax with perfect information must reduce
This reduction in * x is also a reduction of the market failure if there is no strong reversal of market failure. In other words, an inefficiently low complementary tax may still exacerbate the market failure but less than a tax-only policy.
Third, there exists an efficient complementary policy which does not fully crowd out moral motivation while an efficient tax-only policy would do so, if the provision of information causes a strong net increase in moral motivation and/or a strong cross reduction in the marginal crowding of taxes such that
, 0 0 and
The superiority of a complementary policy approach as hypothesized by Frey (1999) can thus only be confirmed for specific parameter constellations. Our results suggest that, first, a tax should be complemented with the provision of perfect information if and only if A is undermotivated. Second, such a complementary policy reduces the risk of exacerbating the market failure by inefficiently low taxes. Third, for certain parameter constellations, an efficient complementary policy does not fully crowd-out moral motivation while the efficient tax-only policy does.
Conclusion
We have studied motivation-crowding to analyze the influence of governmental policies on individual responsibility in a situation of negative consumption externalities and motivation crowding. To this end, we have formulated a model where we model motivation crowding as a preference change due to extrinsic intervention, namely taxes and provision of information. We have shown that in the absence of government regulation, responsible behavior will, in general, not lead to Pareto efficiency. Only if the individuals' basic moral motivation and knowledge meet a very restrictive condition, responsible behavior leads to Pareto-efficiency. It is much more likely that individuals' are either under-motivated or over-motivated. If individuals are under-motivated, moral motivation diminishes the extent of the market failure. The necessity for governmental intervention then remains, but becomes less urgent than if there was no moral motivation. If individuals are over-motivated, moral motivation increases the market failure.
Further, we have shown that a Pigouvian tax as a single instrument is Pareto efficient in all situations. There may exist more than one efficient tax rate. Motivation crowding thus does not question the efficiency of taxes. But it creates three problems with taxation: first, crowding requires a higher tax rate which may be difficult for a government to implement due to political pressure. Second, setting a tax rate inefficiently low may exacerbate the market failure. And third, an efficient tax rate may fully crowd-out moral motivation which is harmful if there are motivational spill-overs.
For the provision of descriptive information, our analysis shows that it might lead to Pareto efficiency under very restrictive assumptions. But it may be well suited to diminish the extent of the market failure. The instrument should be used with caution since its effectiveness is contingent on several parameter values: individuals' knowledge, their basic moral motivation and the extent the information crowding effect. For example, when individuals consume excessive amounts of a polluting good and underestimate the externality, provision of information diminishes the market failure if the crowding effects are not too strong.
Since both instruments, taxes and provision of information, have serious weaknesses when applied on their own, we considered a third policy option: a complementary policy, consisting of both instruments (as e.g. proposed by Frey 1999) . Such a complementary policy may require a lower taxe rate, may reduce the risk of exacerbating the market failure by inefficiently low taxes, and may lead to efficiency without fully crowding-out moral motivation. The drawback is that these effects are highly contingent on parameter values. We thus can recommend a complementary policy for some but not for all cases.
For decision makers facing externalities, our study shows that the extent of crowding effects should be tested before implementing a policy regime. It is necessary to find out if there are one or more efficient tax rates to be able to choose the one with the most desired side effects, such as tax income level or incentive distortions. Further, governments should know if provision of information is at least effective in diminishing the market failure or if it is counterproductive. If there are motivational spill-overs to be expected, governments should consider a complementary policy if crowding effects from information are strong enough. Lastly, governments should be aware that they should not implement a tax at all rather than implementing an inefficiently low tax which may increase the problem.
For economists, our study has two major implications. First, empirical research needs to further investigate in how far higher taxes or levels of information cause stronger crowding than lower taxes or levels of information, and in how far complementary instruments affect the crowding effects of taxes. These insights will be crucial in understanding the efficiency and effectiveness of taxes and other instruments. Second, our analysis suggests that economists should re-think existing market based instruments. One seemingly fruitful starting point is a paper by Mellström and Johannesson (2008) . They show that crowding effects of taxes are contingent on the redistribution regime. The full effects of ecological tax reforms may thus depend on whether the tax income is e.g. spent for environmental innovation or for pension funds. Still, it may even be necessary to think of new instruments or draw more attention to the use of command and control instruments, since their effectiveness is not contingent on crowding effects. For both individuals, the equilibrium allocation is a utility maximum s.t. the respective budget constraint:
a.
b.
Supply equals demand in the markets for both goods: 
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Equilibrium conditions
Utility maximization of individual A leads to the following Lagrangian:
Differentiating with respect to y A , x and A λ yields three first-order conditions, from which it is apparent that 1 A λ = . With this, the two remaining first-order conditions are:
( )
Utility maximization of individual B leads to the following Lagrangian:
The resulting first-order condition requires that B spends all his income on B y :
As above, let 
Conditions (A) -(E) characterize the equilibrium.
Solution
We now show that conditions (A) -(E) hold for the assumptions of our model.
Condition (A):
The left-hand side of condition (A) is positive and decreasing. Per assumption, for all A I ,t ,i, p , it is characterized by:
The right-hand side of condition (A) is positive and increasing, given that for all
It follows that there exists a * 0 x > for which condition (A) holds. 
Condition (B) and (C):
Since it is possible to consume infinitively small amounts of both goods Y and X, the income of each individual must be large enough to fulfill condition (B) and (C).
Condition (D) and (E):
Per assumption, prices of both goods are exogenously given and fulfill the market clearing conditions.
Since conditions ( (4). □
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We find the necessary first-order conditions for Pareto-efficiency by solving the following maximization problem: 
The Lagrangian is given by: 
Differentiating with respect to y A , y B and x yields three first-order conditions, from which it is apparent that 1 λ = and 1 δ = . The remaining first-order condition is: Using Eq. (4) with , 0 t i = , the equilibrium allocation in the laissez-faire scenario is characterized by
Comparison with Eq. (5) shows that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto-efficient, i.e. LFˆ , x x = if and only if:
Simple rearrangement yields:
Market failure Using Eq. (32), the total derivative of the equilibrium level LF x with respect to µ is given by:
The right hand side of Eq. (35) is clearly negative and LF x decreases with µ . It follows that
. Hence, the extent of the market failure decreases with µ if 1 µ κ < and increases otherwise. □
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Using Eq. (4) with 0 i = and t ∈ ℝ , the equilibrium allocation in the tax-policy scenario is characterized by:
Comparison with Eq. (5) shows that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto-efficient, i.e. 
Simple rearrangements yield:
Call ( ) ( 
Note that solution 2 and 3 require that the marginal crowding effect of the tax is larger than its relative price effect, that is Applying Eq. (6) to the tax only scenario, the market failure is given by ( ),
Since x is not contingent on t, the total derivative of ( ) *, Φ x x with respect to t equals the total derivative of x with respect to t:
Using Eq. (36), we derive the total derivative of x with respect to t. Rearrangements yield:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
which can be rearranged to: i LFx
As there are 4 distinguished cases, Eq. (43) has 4 solutions as shown in Table 1 : 
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The cases b) and c) in Table 1 indicate that the impact of information policies on the consumption levels must not be too large in order to mitigate the market failure. If, e.g. in case c), condition i LF 2 x x x > − is violated, the consumption level decreases from a inefficiently high level LF x to an inefficiently low level i x such that the resulting deviation from the efficient consumption level is larger than in the laissez-faire scenario. This is a strong reversal of the market failure. These cases cannot be solved analytically. 
and if there is no strong reversal of the market failure.
Property (3) From Eq. (45) 
